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COMPLAINANT FRAUD ON THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION:
IS THERE A STANDARD?
The International Trade Commission (ITC), successor to the United
States Tariff Commission,1 is an independent, nonpartisan, quasi-judicial
agency having wide ranging powers to investigate the impact of foreign trade
on the United States economy. It also functions as a technical advisor and
fact-finder to both the Congress and the President in matters dealing with
United States trade policy.2 The ITC's authority extends, inter alia, to in-
vestigations of market disruptions due to imports from Communist coun-
tries, preliminary and final investigation of charges that United States
industry is being injured by the sale of imported goods at less than fair value
("dumping") and countervailing duty investigations.3 Additionally, the ITC
is authorized by section 337 of the Trade Act of 1930 to investigate allega-
tions by domestic industries of unfair competition and unfair acts in the im-
portation of articles into the United States.4 The statute does not define the
1. The United States Tariff Commission was founded by Congress in 1916 as part of the
Revenue Act of 1916 which also created the income tax. Act of September 8, 1916, ch. 463, 39
Stat. 756 (1916). The Commission operated under that name until 1975 when it was changed
to its present form as part of the Trade Act of 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 172(a), tit. III,
§ 341, 88 Stat. 2053 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1330 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)). In
changing the name, Congress intended to recognize the fact that in present day international
trade, tariffs are no longer the most significant barrier to trade and that the Commission's
functions in many areas are not strictly related to tariffs. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE,
TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 25, 115 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as SENATE REPORT].
2. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 115. The ITC describes itself as "bipartisan" rather
than nonpartisan. 1984 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N ANN. REP., Pub. 1718, at ix [hereinafter
cited as 1984 ANN. REP.].
3. 1984 ANN. REP., supra note 2, at 6-7. Market disruption investigations are conducted
pursuant to § 406 of the Trade Act of 1974. 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982). Antidumping investiga-
tions are authorized by 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983) and countervailing duty inves-
tigations by 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).
4. Section 1337(a) is an amendment to § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, popularly known
as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 479, § 337, 46 Stat. 703-4. Section 337 is
the successor to § 316 of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356,
§ 316, 42 Stat. 943-44. Section 316 was intended to have a broad application, "to prevent
every type and form of unfair practice. . . in the importation of goods into the United States."
S. REP. No. 595, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1922). Section 316 clearly reflected the unfair compe-
tition language of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982) and the similarity
was apparent to the Commission in 1922. In its sixth annual report, the Commission noted
that: "[s]ection 316 extends to import trade practically the same prohibition against unfair
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unfair competition or unfair acts. Judicial interpretation, however, indicates
that both terms are to be construed broadly and inclusively in keeping with
the apparent congressional intent that wide discretion be allowed in deter-
mining what acts are unfair.5 Some typical examples of unfair competition
include patent or trademark infringement, misappropriation or infringement
of trade dress, and false designation of origin.6
Section 337 of the Trade Act of 1930 was amended by the Trade Act of
1974,7 but investigations of unfair competitive acts continue to be referred to
as "337 investigations" by the Commission. Complainants seeking relief
under section 337 find the Commission an attractive forum because of the
speed of its procedures,' which are governed by the Administrative Proce-
methods of competition which the Federal Trade Commission Act provides against unfair
methods of competition in interstate trade." 6 U.S. TARIFF COMM'N ANN. REP. 4 (1923).
5. In re von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441, 443-44 (C.C.P.A. 1955). In this case, the Court also
noted that terms should not be limited to certain acts that fit the definition of unfair competi-
tion applied in other circumstances. The Court also held that the unfair act need not substan-
tially injure a domestic industry; it is sufficient to meet the statutory requirement if there is a
tendency to injure substantially a domestic industry. Id. at 445. The following statement is
representative of the ITC position on the term:
Clearly, the legislative history reveals that section 337 was intended to be .. .a
statute directed at reaching a broad variety of unfair acts. Unless some convincing
authority can be found for the proposition that Congress has since limited the scope
of Commission jurisdiction, it is our opinion that Section 337 embraces dumping and
all other unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles
or in their sale.
Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe & Tube, Inv. No. 337-TA-29, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 863, at 17
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Certain Welded Stainless Steel] (citing Certain Color Television
Receiving Sets, Inv. No. 337-TA-23, at 11-12 (1976)).
6. 2 P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 18-29 (1984).
7. 19 U.S.C. § 1330 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983). The major changes in § 337 involved the
roles and authority of the President and the Commission. The amendments gave the Commis-
sion the authority to determine, subject to judicial review, whether § 337 had been violated and
impose appropriate sanctions. Previously the Commission could only recommend to the Presi-
dent that the statute had been violated. The President still retains power to disapprove Com-
mission determination within 60 days of receipt of the Commission determination. Other
changes imposed time limits on Commission investigations and required that the ITC consider
legal and equitable defenses and patent law doctrine and that ITC investigations under § 337
be conducted in accord with the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-559 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983). 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
8. ITC exclusion orders have nationwide effect, and its procedures, in comparison to
federal courts, are extremely fast. Except in rare cases designated "more complicated," which
can extend for eighteen months, § 337 investigations must be completed within twelve months
after publication of notice of the investigation in the Federal Register. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1)
(1982). Because ITC orders have nationwide effect, a complainant is spared the burden of
multiple litigation that would be necessary if a federal district court adjudicated the complaint.
Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-90, U.S.I.T.C.
Pub. 1199, at 18 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps].
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dures Act.9 The attractiveness of the ITC forum has increased in recent
years as United States industries, faced with disruptions caused by the tran-
sition from a goods-producing economy to one dominated by service indus-
tries"° and increased competition from abroad, try to cope with a changing
national and international economy. Indicative of the increased recourse to
the ITC in recent years is the sharp increase in the number of exclusion
orders issued by the ITC as a result of section 337 investigations. For exam-
ple, on May 1, 1984, twenty-eight exclusion orders were in effect, almost ten
times the number issued from 1944 to 1969.11
ITC section 337 investigations frequently involve allegations by a domes-
tic manufacturer of patent infringement in the importation of competing for-
eign products, 12 a form of unfair competition not formerly recognized at
9. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1982) requires that the ITC base certain determinations, includ-
ing § 337 investigations, "on the record after notice and opportunity for a hearing in conform-
ity with the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5," of the United States Code.
10. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., 1985 U.S. INDUSTR. OUTLOOK
38-42 (surveying the growth of the United States economy over the previous two years and
observing that service industries account for over two-thirds of the gross national product and
have been growing faster than goods producing industries; in 1983, 74% of the labor force was
employed in service industries).
11. Palmeter, The US. International Trade Commission at Common Law, 18 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 497, 511 n.67 (1984). In addition to permanent exclusion orders, the ITC is em-
powered to issue cease and desist orders and temporary exclusion orders. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)-
(f)(1) (1982). The Secretary of the Treasury is charged with enforcing ITC exclusion orders.
Id. § 1337(d).
To gain relief in a patent-based § 337 proceeding, a complainant must (1) prove the allega-
tions of unfair competition and patent infringement, (2) establish that the allegedly infringing
goods have been imported into the United States, and (3) show that the importation injures, or
has a tendency to injure, (4) an economically and efficiently operated domestic industry. 19
U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982); 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:38,
at 543 (1984).
Section 337 protects only that part of the domestic industry adversely affected by the unfair
act. However, the Commission, taking into account marketplace realities, broadly construes
the term domestic industry. According to the Commission, it includes, in addition to subcon-
tractors, that part of complainant's operations involved in the development, production, de-
sign, sale, servicing and licensing covered by the patent at suit. Certain Apparatus for the
Continuous Production of Copper Rod, Inv. No. 337-TA-89, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 1132, at 16
(1981).
12. The majority of investigations under § 337 and its predecessor, § 316, has involved
allegations of patent infringement in the importation of goods into the United States. In 1919,
the Commission, not Congress, first raised the possibility of considering patent infringement as
an element of unfair competition. The Commission actually recognized patent infringement as
an unfair act in Synthetic Phenolic Resin of Form C and Articles Made Wholly or in Part
Thereof, Inv. No. 316-4 (1927) [hereinafter cited as Synthetic Phenolic Resin]. In 1930, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, then the ITC's reviewing court, agreed that patent
infringement could constitute unfair competition within the cognizance of the ITC. Frischer
& Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247, 259-60 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 852 (1930)
Certain Headboxes & Papermaking Machine Forming Sections for the Continuous Production
1986]
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common law. 13 The ITC has jurisdiction to investigate such complaints and
issue exclusion orders or other appropriate remedies.14 Because, by statute,
all legal and equitable defenses are available to respondents in section 337
investigations,' 5 a common defense raised by the domestic importer or the
foreign manufacturer is that the patent is invalid because it was procured
through inequitable conduct or fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO). 6 A patent procured by fraudulent means is invalid and, hence, un-
enforceable. '7 By statute, a patent is presumed valid, and the respondent has
the burden to prove invalidity.18 If respondent carries his burden of proof
on this issue, and complainant has alleged no other unfair acts, respondent
will prevail because patent invalidity is an absolute defense. The Commis-
sion's jurisdiction is preempted if the invalidity has been judicially deter-
mined. Moreover, complainant must prove each element of section 1337(a)
of Paper, & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-82, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 1138 (1981) (Stem,
Comm'r, dissenting) at 2-4 [hereinafter cited as Headboxes] (discussion of patent infringement
and § 337).
Interestingly, there is no indication that Congress considered patent infringement an unfair
competitive act in the context of international trade when it passed § 316 of the Trade Act of
1922. Stark, Protection for Process Patents Against Imported Goods, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1254,
1259 (1959).
13. See Herrington, Unfair Practices in the Import Trade: Proceedings by the United
States International Trade Commission Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 1982 J.
Bus. L. 162; Leonard & Foster, The Metamorphosis of the U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion Under the Trade Act of 1974, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 719, 751 (1976); W. Herrington, The
Proper Interpretation of Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (1978) (unpublished thesis,
GWU National Law Center) (available in library of the ITC).
14. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982 & Supp. 1983). Frequently, jurisdiction over a foreign pro-
ducer is difficult to obtain in a district court and an injunction against one importer will be
ineffective relief because other potential importers are available. The ITC jurisdictional rules
are thus highly attractive to a complainant. In a § 337 proceeding, the ITC does not require in
personam jurisdiction; the mere presence of the imported product is sufficient to confer juris-
diction and obtain a hearing before the ITC. Certain Optical Waveguide Fibers, Inv. No. 337-
TA-189, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 1754, at 3-4 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Certain Optical Waveguide
Fibers] (views of Vice-Chairman Liebler). See Textron, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1985). For a general discussion of ITC jurisdiction, see
Perry, The In Rem Jurisdiction of Section 337 Unfair Trade Investigations, 2 INT'L L. BULL.
40 (1980) (concluding that ITC jurisdiction is frequently misunderstood and that ITC deci-
sions and case law support the in rem nature of ITC jurisdiction under § 337). The ITC
occasionally has misinterpreted its jurisdictional requirement finding that it needed in per-
sonam jurisdiction when it did not; nonetheless, the court affirmed the ITC's decision. Sealed
Air Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 209 U.S.P.Q. 469, 478-79 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
15. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1982).
16. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Western United States Indus., 608 F.2d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir.
1979).
17. Certain Multicellular Plastic Film, U.S.I.T.C. Inv. No. 337-TA-54, 206 U.S.P.Q. 244,
246-47 (1979).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1982); 206 U.S.P.Q. at 248 (party asserting patent infringement must
prove it; party asserting invalidity of patent has burden of proof).
[Vol. 35:545
Complainant Fraud on the ITC
to prevail: a) the unfair act, b) the existence of an efficiently and economi-
cally operated domestic industry, and c) injury or tendency to injure. The
last two elements are, relatively speaking, easier for complainant to prove
than for respondent to disprove' 9 because the Commission interprets these
requirements broadly.2"
The concept of fraud on the PTO is noted in the PTO regulations 2 and
recognized by the courts. Despite complementing functions and procedural
similarities between the PTO and the ITC,22 neither the Tariff Act of 1930,
as amended, nor the ITC's rules and procedures specifically recognizes the
defense of "fraud on the Commission" in the context of section 337 investi-
gations. This defense avoids consideration of the merits of the complaint
and seeks dismissal by alleging fraudulent conduct by the complainant.
2 3
The fraudulent conduct can involve any form of inequitable conduct, but
usually the allegation asserts that the complainant failed to disclose material
information to the ITC in violation of the duty of candor. The defense is
sometimes made by analogy to the PTO and by reference to the pleading
19. The tendency-to-injure standard is not particularly difficult for a complainant to meet.
Nonetheless, there is congressional sentiment to eliminate the injury requirement entirely. In
September, Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.) introduced the Intellectual Property Rights
Enforcement Amendments of 1985, to amend the statute, inter alia, by eliminating the injury
requirement and the requirement that complainant establish a prima facie case when respon-
dent defaults. S. 1647, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S 11,476-77 (daily ed. Sept. 13,
1985). The Senator indicated that infringement of an intellectual property right, copyright,
trademark, or patent, is per se injury. Id. at S 11,475-76 (remarks of Sen. Lautenberg). The
bill's cosponsor indicated that some of the current statute's requirements make "no sense"
because the Tariff Act of 1930 was originally designed to cover a broad range of unfair acts.
Id. at 11,477 (remarks of Sen. Roth).
20. See supra note 5.
21. The relevant sections of the PTO regulations provide:
(a) A duty of candor and good faith toward the Patent and Trademark Office rests on
the inventor, on each attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the application
and on every other individual who is substantively involved in the preparation or
prosecution of the application and who is associated with the inventor, with the as-
signee or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the application. .All
such individuals have a duty to disclose to the Office information they are aware of
which is material to the examination of the application. Such information is material
where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it
important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent. The duty
is commensurate with the degree of involvement in the preparation or prosecution of
the application.
(d) No patent will be granted on an application in connection with which fraud on
the Office was practiced or attempted or the duty of disclosure was violated through
bad faith or gross negligence . . ..
37 C.F.R. §§ 1.56(a), 1.56(d) (1985).
22. See infra notes 97-106, 118-23, and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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requirements of the ITC24 and the public policy concerns that underlie the
statute, particularly since the amendments of 1974.25 A large body of case
law deals with the equitable defense of fraud on the PTO. Some of the law is
applicable to the ITC because of the legislative directive that the ITC "con-
sider the evolution of patent law doctrines" in determining violations of the
statute and review the validity of patents "in accordance with contemporary
legal standards ... 26 Surprisingly, although the defense of "fraud on the
Commission" has been raised in section 337 proceedings and addressed by
administrative law judges, the Commission itself has not determined what
standards apply to this defense in the context of section 337. The most re-
cent ITC decision 27 on the issue by the chief administrative law judge illus-
trates the need for some direction on the issue of fraud on the ITC in section
337 proceedings. The opinion addressed the issue of complainant fraud on
the ITC during the institution stage of a section 337 proceeding. It applied a
standard at variance with recent decisions by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit dealing with fraud on the PTO. In addition,
the judge's opinion ignored public interest factors that should be relevant in
all section 337 investigations.
This Comment will briefly note the elements of the more familiar common
law fraud and make a comparison to the less familiar concept of fraud on the
PTO, which is broader in its application. It will then consider the standards
used in evaluating the concept of fraud on the PTO. Finally, in trying to
determine what standard should be applied by the ITC in dealing with the
defense of fraud on the Commission, it will point out the functional and
procedural similarities between the PTO and the ITC. To encourage scien-
tific and technological development, the PTO awards a patent that creates a
limited monopoly intended to ensure that the developer or inventor recoups
the cost of investment and reaps the financial and other benefits of the inven-
24. See, e.g., U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, subch. C, pt. 210-Adjudicative Procedures, 19
C.F.R. § 210.20 (1985) (setting forth the details that must be included in a complaint and
requiring that it be signed and under oath).
25. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 197. "The Committee believes that the public
health and welfare and the assurance of competitive conditions in the United States economy
must be the overriding considerations in the administration of this statute." The Committee
also described the public interest as "paramount." Id. at 193.
26. Id. at 196. Despite the Committee's belief that the ITC should review patent validity
and enforceability, it noted that the Commission's findings on these issues are relevant only in
§ 337 proceedings; they are not binding interpretations of U.S. patent law nor do they have res
judicata or collateral estoppel effect in federal court. Id.
27. Certain Fluidized Bed Combustion Systems, Inv. No. 337-TA-213, Order No. 19
(1985) [hereinafter cited as Order No. 19] (Allegations that complainant committed fraud on
the Commission by failing to disclose the complete status of foreign counterpart patents and
patent applications to the patents at issue in the investigation.).
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tion. An ITC exclusion order, in a patent-based section 337 proceeding,
complements the grant of a patent. While the patent offers protection from
domestic competition in the given market, an ITC exclusion order protects
the patentee's market to ensure the patentee can recoup the cost of invention
as well as the profits that encourage the taking of risks in the development of
new technology. The Comment will conclude that the ITC, which frequently
deals with the patent issues in section 337 investigations,28 should adopt the
standard applied by the PTO in dealing with fraud on the Commission.
I. THE DUTY OF DISCLOSURE AND FRAUD IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT
A. Fraud on the Patent Office
Under the common law, fraud was generally held to require proof of five
elements: (1) false representation of a material fact; (2) belief in, or knowl-
edge of, its falsity by the person making the representation; (3) belief in the
truth of the false statement by the person to whom it was made; (4) intent
that it should be acted upon; and (5) detrimental reliance by the person to
whom the misrepresentation was made.29 The elements of common law
fraud apply in inter partes proceedings, but proceedings before the PTO are
ex parte. In addition, the PTO standards, as set out in rule 56, do not re-
quire that all elements of common law fraud be proven in PTO proceed-
ings.3° The concept of fraud on the PTO is, as the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit noted, "fraught with confusion and contradiction ....
The PTO rules provide a convenient starting point in trying to come to
28. The vast majority of cases arising under § 337 and its predecessor involved issues of
patent infringement. Headboxes, supra note 12, at 2 (Stern, Comm'r, dissenting). However,
on the whole, most ITC investigations involve dumping and subsidy complaints, but these are
not dealt with under § 337. Stem, New Directions for the Trade Laws, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L
L. & EcON. 709, 712 (1985).
29. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, §§ 100-105 (3d ed. 1964).
30. See supra note 21.
31. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
The confusion and contradiction has been due to the fact that formerly patent cases could be
appealed in any circuit court of appeals. Various courts frequently applied different and con-
flicting standards. To help end the confusion, Congress in 1982 created the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, replacing the present system of geographical jurisdiction with subject
matter jurisdiction. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat.
25. Over the next several years, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is likely to reduce
both confusion and contradiction as it develops its own standards and precedents. The Federal
Circuit has already indicated that it is not bound by the decision of appellate courts other than
its predecessor courts, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the United
States Court of Claims. South Corporation v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
The inherited jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit includes patent appeals from the Patent and
Trademark Office, the ITC, and patent infringement cases involving the federal government.
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grips with the nebulous concept of fraud on the PTO. The PTO rules state
that a patent application will be rejected if there is clear and convincing
evidence of fraud in connection with the application, or if the applicant vio-
lates the duty of disclosure through bad faith or gross negligence in connec-
tion with the pending application or any previous application on which it
depends.32 Although the PTO rules do not further define fraud, it is gener-
ally held to require a demonstration of three elements: (1) misrepresentation
or omission; (2) of a material fact; (3) of which the applicant had reason to
know the truth. 33 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit noted in Eudy v. Motor Guide, Herschede Hall Clock Co., the concept of
fraud on the PTO goes beyond the elements included in the common law
definition of fraud as it encompasses a wide variety of inequitable conduct.
34
While the Fifth Circuit provided no exhaustive list of misconduct, it indi-
cated that deliberate misstatements and concealment of material facts that
would have caused the PTO to deny the patent were sufficient to establish
inequitable conduct or fraud, provided there was a showing of bad faith. By
declining to list the type of misconduct that would invalidate a patent, the
court intended to retain its flexibility in dealing with this amorphous con-
cept. However, the requirement of bad faith and the court's comment that
the patent system involves the public interest suggest that its intent was to
protect the integrity of the patent system. This interpretation of the court's
rationale is supported by dicta indicating that negligent omissions or mis-
statements will not invalidate a patent.35
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which hears
appeals from the ITC and the PTO, used the same line of reasoning in deal-
ing with fraud. However, the court's opinion in J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex
Tex Ltd.,36 adopted the term inequitable conduct rather than fraud because
it avoided the possibility of confusion with common law fraud. The court
noted that inequitable conduct includes affirmative misrepresentation and
omission, making it broader than common law fraud.37 Moreover, the re-
quirement of scienter, or intent, a major element in charges of fraud under
For a general discussion of the new court, see Lever, The New Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 64 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 178 (1982).
32. See supra note 21.
33. 2 P. ROSENBERG, supra note 6, § 15.08, at 76-78 (1984). See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co.
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 196 U.S.P.Q. 726, 743 (N.D. Ala. 1977); Hycor Corp. v.
Schleuter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1538-40 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
34. 211 U.S.P.Q. 921, 925 (5th Cir. 1981) (no fixed parameters to type of misconduct
before the PTO that will result in patent invalidity; but element of bad faith required).
35. Id.
36. 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984). For a discussion of the opinion in this case, see
infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
37. 747 F.2d at 1559.
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the common law standard, is not applicable in the context of ex parte deal-
ings with the PTO where proof of deliberate scheming is unnecessary.3" The
standard of proof in asserting fraudulent procurement of a patent as an af-
firmative defense requires clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence of in-
tent and materiality. 39  There is, however, no single test to determine
materiality in the context of inequitable conduct.' Instead, the Federal Cir-
cuit has noted that it will accept any of four tests as valid.4 ' Additionally,
intent may be inferred. For example, it is presumed that the actor intended
the natural consequences of his act.42 Simple negligence or an error in judg-
ment is not sufficient to prove intent, but gross negligence is sufficient, as is a
clear showing that a reasonable person in the position of the applicant would
have reasonably known that such information was material.43
B. Equity, the Public Interest, and the Duty of Candor
Judicial decisions dealing with the issue of fraud or inequitable conduct in
the context of patent litigation are based on equitable principles that are also
reflected in the PTO rules, such as rule 56. In addressing the issue of fraudu-
lent procurement of a patent, the Supreme Court has cited the well-known
maxim that "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands."" The
38. Id. at 1560. See Digital Equipment Corp. v. Diamond, 210 U.S.P.Q. 521, 532-33 (1st
Cir. 1981). The court stated that fraud on the Patent Office is distinct from common law fraud
in that the requirement of scienter is relaxed because of the courts' perception of the special
relationship between PTO and applicant. See infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
39. Rohm & Haas, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 743. Accord, In re Multidistrict Litigation Involving
Frost Patent, 191 U.S.P.Q. 241, 243 (3d Cir. 1976).
40. Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 759 F.2d 10, 14 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
For a discussion of the opinion in Argus, see infra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
41. The four tests identified by the Federal Circuit include: (1) the objective "but for"
test; (2) the subjective "but for;" (3) the "might have been;" and (4) the PTO rule 1.56(a).
American Hoist & Derrick, 725 F.2d at 1362; accord, J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1559.
42. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 220 U.S.P.Q. 289, 301 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In
Rohm & Haas, the court held that proof of the applicant's state of mind is not required when
fraud is the issue.
43. Carpet Seaming Tap Licensing Corp. v. Best Seam, Inc., 616 F.2d 1133, 1139-40 (9th
Cir. 1980); Driscoll v. Ceballo, 731 F.2d 878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
44. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
814 (1945). The Court held that the equitable doctrine of unclean hands barred plaintiff in an
infringement suit from enforcing patents obtained without full disclosure to the PTO of possi-
ble perjury in an interference proceeding. The Court also stated that the duty of disclosure is
uncompromising and is not excused by reasonable doubts regarding proof of inequitable con-
duct because the public interest demands that all facts be presented to the PTO for evaluation
of the offered proof. Id. at 816-18.
The Court reemphasized the importance of the public interest in patent related suits in Lear,
Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670-71 (1969) where the Court held that "technical requirements
of contract doctrine" must yield to the public interest in the negotiations of a license after a
patent has been issued. Lear involved license estoppel and the Lear decision, by allowing a
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maxim applies with particular force in the area of patents and patent litiga-
tion because the issuance of a patent involves more than the interests of pri-
vate parties. The public interest is intimately involved because a patent is an
exception to the general policy against monopolies,45 and it contravenes the
general principle that there should be free access to the marketplace.46
Given this significant, if limited, exception to deeply entrenched principles,
the courts have found that the "far reaching social and economic conse-
quences" of the grant of a patent4 7 require that the public interest be para-
mount. Additionally, the patent system must be free from fraud and other
inequitable conduct. 48 This policy-based approach is designed to deny the
wrongdoer the benefits of his transgression, to protect the public from injury,
and to insure the integrity of the patent system.49 The result of these factors
is that fraud in dealing with the PTO is broader than common law fraud,50
and subjective "good faith" is not a defense as it is in common fraud.5 '
Aside from the broadly construed public interest factor, the courts have
also found that there is a fiduciary relation of trust between the applicant for
a patent and the PTO,52 which justifies the application of a strict standard of
conduct. Throughout the prosecution of a patent, the relationship between
the applicant and the PTO is confidential and ex parte,5 3 not adversarial.5 4
The prosecution of a patent is, in fact, secret.5 5 On a less theoretical level,
some courts have noted very practical reasons for holding patent applicants
licensee to challenge the validity of the licensor's patent, overruled precedent set in Automatic
Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950). 395 U.S. at 668-71.
45. 324 U.S. at 816. The Court stated that the equitable maxim is more than a "mere
banality." It "closes the doors" of a court of equity to those seeking relief who are tainted by
bad faith or inequitable conduct. Id. at 814.
46. Id.
47. Id. One consequence of the grant of a patent is, of course, that the patentee is entitled
to a 100% share of the market.
48. Precision Instrument Mfg., 324 U.S. at 816.
49. Id. at 815-16.
50. Argus Chem. Corp., 759 F.2d at 14.
51. Id. at 14-15. Accord, Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1971). It should be
noted that a party guilty of committing fraud on the PTO may be subject to criminal penalties
under 18 U.S.C. 1001 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983), the so called "false statement statute." See
Miller, Fraud on the PTO, 58 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 271, 276-77 (1976).
52. Dresser Indus. v. Eltra Corp., 186 U.S.P.Q. 329, 361 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
53. Fisher, Protection Against Unfair Foreign Competition: Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 158, 169 (1972).
54. Transitron Elec. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 487 F. Supp. 885, 907 (D. Mass.),
afl'd, 649 F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1980).
55. In relevant part, the PTO regulations provide that:
[P]atent applications are preserved in secrecy. No information will be given by the
Office respecting the filing by any particular person of an application for a patent, the
pendency of any particular case before it, or the subject matter of any particular
application, nor will access be given to or copies furnished of any pending application
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to a strict code of conduct in dealing with the PTO. The PTO does not have
the personnel, facilities or laboratories to test the claims made in the prose-
cution of a patent56 nor does it have the staff to check fully for relevant prior
art. As a consequence of these limited resources and the absence of an ad-
versary, the PTO must rely on disclosure by the applicant to evaluate the
application and to determine whether a patent should issue.5 7 The duty of
affirmative disclosure imposed on the patent applicant is the same strict stan-
dard of disclosure required of sellers of securities to the public.58
These factors combine to create what the courts call the duty of candor in
dealing with the PTO. 9 This is a strict, uncompromising standard that for-
bids affirmative misrepresentation as well as omission.6' Moreover, the fact
of misrepresentation or concealment is regarded as more important than the
substance of what is misrepresented or concealed in the prosecution of a
patent.6 ' Thus, a patent may be held invalid even if the misrepresented or
omitted facts are immaterial, if there was an intent to mislead the PTO.62
The duty of candor is so uncompromising that one court has held that it
would be a "death blow" to the duty if proof of intent were required.63 Any-
thing less than full and complete disclosure violates the applicant's duty of
absolute candor and is sufficient to hold the applicant guilty of fraudulent or
or papers relating thereto, without written authority in that particular application
from the applicant or his assignee or attorney or agent of record ....
37 C.F.R. § 1.14(a) (1985).
56. Dresser Indus., 186 U.S.P.Q. at 361.
57. Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 312 F. Supp. 778, 793 (E.D. Pa. 1970), afTd, 456
F.2d 592 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972).
58. Id. The court held that Supreme Court decisions require the highest degree of candor
from a patent applicant because the PTO should not be put to the trouble of deciding whether
to issue a patent on the basis of incomplete or distorted information. The Court also stated
that there is no rational basis to distinguish affirmative misrepresentation from misleading
omissions. In comparing the duty a patent applicant owes to the PTO with the duty owed to
the public by a dealer in securities, the Court stated:
Under the securities law, one who sells or offers securities for sale must not omit to
state in his registration statement, prospectus, or any other communication directed
to the public any material fact necessary to be stated in order to make the communi-
cation taken as whole, not misleading. The same standard of candor should also
apply to the patent applicant and, when deliberately violated in order to mislead,
should result in the denial of a patent. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. RKO General v. FCC, 670 F.2d 215, 230-32 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928
(1981).
62. Monsanto Co., 312 F. Supp. at 794 (a patent will be invalidated for equitable and
public policy reasons, "even if misrepresented or omitted facts are not material" if there is
intent to mislead).
63. Kansan Jack, Inc. v. Kahn, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 861.
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inequitable conduct in procuring the patent.64
The duty of candor has been held to apply to administrative agencies
other than the PTO where the agencies' decisions involve the public interest
and have an effect similar to the grant of a patent. For example, noting that
proceedings before the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) are not
private lawsuits and that the FCC must rely on information submitted by an
applicant, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit found that an applicant has an "affirmative obligation" to provide
the FCC with the information it needs to issue licenses in the public inter-
est. 65 The court upheld the FCC's denial of a renewal on the ground that
the applicant violated the duty of candor.66 In FCC v. WOKO, Inc.,6 7 the
Supreme Court held that even useless and immaterial deceptions are suffi-
cient evidence of a willingness to deceive and that the fact of concealment is
more important than what is concealed. The rationale for the Court's deter-
mination was that the Commission must rely on applicants for information
and that the Commission is charged with serving the public interest.68
These factors apply with equal weight to the ex parte, preinstitution stage of
section 337 proceedings before the ITC.
In WOKO the Supreme Court also recognized the right of an administra-
tive agency to protect the integrity of its proceedings through the use of
sanctions. Noting that the FCC must rely on reports submitted by its licen-
sees, the Court rejected the argument that because misrepresentation was
not uncommon in FCC proceedings and had not prior to the case before the
Court provoked the drastic sanction of non-renewal, such a sanction was
inappropriate in this case.69 Instead, the Court held that the agency's right
to apply severe sanctions was justified by the "very fact that temporizing and
compromising with deception" had not dealt with the problem.7 °
Outside the administrative agency context, the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure also require a high degree of candor and integrity when the authority
of the court is involved and provides sanctions for abuses. In 1983, for ex-
ample, rule 11 was revised to discourage frivolous litigation and abusive
practices.7 ' Its provisions, applicable equally to attorneys and pro se liti-
64. Precision Instrument Mfg., 324 U.S. at 818.
65. RKO General v. FCC, 670 F.2d at 228-29.
66. Id. at 230, 232.
67. 329 U.S. 223, 227 (1946).
68. Id. at 228-29.
69. Id. at 228.
70. Id.
71. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D.
181 (1985) (Schwarzer is a U.S. District Judge, Northern District, California).
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gants, 72 sanction conduct that is less than wilfulness or bad faith but none-
theless involves abuse or misuse of judicial processes.7 3 Significantly, it
eliminates ignorance as a defense and leaves "no room for a pure heart,
empty head defense.",74 Consequently, when rule 11 is violated, the Court
may impose an "appropriate sanction.",
71
The ITC, as noted below,76 has expressed its concern with preserving the
integrity of its forum, at least as far as the due process aspects of its proceed-
ings are concerned. It therefore would appear to be consistent for the ITC to
extend its concern for the integrity of the forum to the issue of fraud on the
Commission. The Supreme Court's decision in WOKO would appear to ap-
prove the application of severe sanctions, such as dismissal of a complain-
ant's case. Moreover, the Federal Circuit has recognized that existing case
law would support denial of a patent's enforceability where there has been
fraud on the Commission itself.77 The ITC has already shown a willingness
to follow and to adopt certain PTO standards in patent-based section 337
proceedings. It therefore would be consistent with ITC precedent for the
Commission to adopt PTO standards when the ITC itself is the victim of
fraudulent behavior. Applying patent law doctrine, the ITC has held, for
example, that all unlawful or inequitable conduct is sufficient to bar enforce-
ment of "all patents that are sufficiently related to that conduct to bring
them within the 'unclean hands' doctrine.",78  Given the complementing
functions and procedural similarities of the ITC and the PTO, it would seem
that if certain inequitable conduct justifies an extreme sanction before the
PTO, the same type sanction should be warranted before the ITC.
C. Fraud and the ITC
The defense 79 of patent validity due to fraudulent procurement is fre-
72. Id. at 184.
73. Id. at 206.
74. Id. at 187.
75. Id. at 181.
76. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
77. SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 379 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (Fraud on the ITC itself sufficient to deny enforcement of a patent under Supreme Court
decisions).
78. Certain Amorphous Metals & Amorphous Metal Articles, Inv. No. 337-TA-143,
U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 1664, at 89-90 (1984) (citing Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavation Co.,
290 U.S. 240 (1933)).
79. In § 337 proceedings, the usual defenses are: (1) lack of importation, (2) lack of do-
mestic industry, (3) lack of injury or tendency to injure, (4) lack of efficient and economic
operation of the domestic industry, (5) patent held judicially invalid, (6) invalidity, (7) nonin-
fringement, (8) misuse, and (9) misrepresentation or fraud on the PTO. H. KAYE & P. PLAIA,
THE TARIFF COMMISSION AND PATENTS: ANATOMY OF A 337 ACTION pt. I, at 414 (1973).
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quently made in section 337 ITC proceedings dealing with patent-based
charges of unfair competition. 80  However, the defense of "fraud on the
Commission" is not frequently made in these investigations. The two de-
fenses are similar in that both are equitable and rely on the clean hands
doctrine, but their approach is different. When respondent in a section 337
proceeding raises the defense of fraud on the PTO, he attempts to rely on the
equitable doctrine of unclean hands by reference to a related event-the pro-
curement of the patent-that took place outside the ITC forum and is not
directly related to the forum's concern, unfair competition. In contrast,
when respondent raises the defense of fraud on the Commission, he again
relies on the doctrine of unclean hands, but the focus is changed, being di-
rected at the ITC, itself, and its procedures. Thus, respondent tries to avoid
consideration of the merits of complainant's allegation of unfair competition
by procuring dismissal through allegations that complainant defrauded the
Commission itself, either in filing the original complaint or during the ex
parte stages of the investigation. The defense of fraud on the PTO is easier
to raise because it is recognized in the PTO rules" and has been sanctioned
judicially. In the case of the defense of fraud on the Commission, the re-
spondent is on less firm ground. The word fraud does not even appear in the
ITC's rules of practice and procedure.8 2
Although the Commission can initiate an investigation sua sponte, the
usual procedure is that a complaint is filed alleging injury to a domestic
industry by unfair competitive acts in the importation of articles into the
United States. In a patent-based complaint, the ITC rules require that the
complaint contain substantial detail regarding the patent, the domestic in-
80. Leonard & Foster, supra note 13, at 751. At common law, patent infringement was
not recognized as a type of unfair competition. Herrington, supra note 13, at 30. Patent in-
fringement was first alleged as an unfair competitive act in a Commission proceeding in Syn-
thetic Phenolic Resin, discussed supra note 12. Kaye & Plaia, Revitalization of Unfair Trade
Causes in the Importation ofGoods: An Analysis of the Amendments to Section 337, 57 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 208, 216 (1975). It has been recognized as an unfair trade practice since 1930.
Consequently, the defense of fraudulent procurement is an available defense in ITC proceed-
ings because all legal and equitable defenses that may be raised in patent infringement cases in
federal district court may also be raised before the ITC. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1982); see also
Kaye & Plaia, Developments in Unfair Trade Practices in International Trade. A Review of the
Third and Fourth Years Under Section 337 as Amended by the Trade Act of 1974, 61 J. PAT.
OFF. SOc'Y 115, 117-18 (1979) (full range of patent defenses now raised in § 337 investiga-
tions). Moreover, the legislative intent that the ITC consider patent law doctrine as well as
defenses based on equitable and antitrust principles is embodied in 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c), (d).
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 195-96. For a discussion of § 337 as an antitrust rem-
edy, see Schaumberg, Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 as an Antitrust Remedy, 27 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 51 (1982).
81. See supra note 21.
82. 19 C.F.R. ch. I (1984).
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dustry, and the alleged injury.83 Deliberate omission or misrepresentation of
required information might suffice to give merit to the equitable defense of
fraud on the Commission. For example, in an investigation based on allega-
tions of patent infringement, a respondent can rely on Commission Rule
210.20(a)(iv) 4 as a basis for a defense alleging fraud on the Commission.
This rule, however, merely requires that a complainant list all foreign pat-
ents, pending or denied applications, and the status of pending applications
for patents that correspond to the patent at issue in the section 337
investigation. 5
In November 1984, the Commission amended the rule to require disclo-
sure of rejected foreign applications.86 The Commission explained that the
amendment is intended to facilitate discovery on patent issues in section 337
investigations.8 7 The ITC rules and the Commission's explication of its revi-
sion do not provide any sanctions for violations of the Commission's rules
and procedures at the institution stage of section 337 investigations, but the
ITC apparently has statutory authority to do so.
88
Despite the fact that the Commission rules do not specifically recognize
the defense of fraud on the Commission in section 337 proceedings, respon-
dents have raised the defense of fraud or inequitable conduct on the Com-
mission, usually unsuccessfully.89 In one investigation, the respondent
moved for dismissal because the complainant allegedly failed to submit, as
required by the Commission rules, complete information regarding its facili-
ties and the number of workers employed in production of the article in-
volved in the investigation.90 The respondent further alleged that
complainant's omission of material information manifested "a pervasive pat-
tern of bad faith and inequitable conduct" that warranted immediate dismis-
sal of the complaint because such conduct breached the complainant's duty
83. 19 C.F.R. § 210.20 (1985).
84. Id. § 210.20(a)(9)(iv).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Revisions of Rules Pertaining to Investigations of Unfair Practices In Import Trade,
49 Fed. Reg. 46,123, at 46,123-24 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 210) (requiring the explicit
disclosure of rejected foreign patents will facilitate discovery on patent related issues).
88. The wording of 19 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982) grants the Commission the authority to adopt
procedures and rules necessary to carry out its functions; arguably, this confers on the Com-
mission the power specifically to impose a duty of candor on complainants and would, addi-
tionally, be in keeping with the detailed rules governing the filing of the initial complaint.
89. See, e.g., Order No. 19, supra note 27; Composite Diamond Coated Textile Machinery
Components, Inv. No. 337-TA-160, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 1603 (1984) (commission final action did
not even address issue of fraud raised during the investigation).
90. Certain Softballs & Polyurethane Cores Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-190, Order No. 10,
at 2 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Order No. 10 (1984)].
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of candor and demonstrated an intent to deceive. 91
In denying respondent's motion to terminate the investigation, the admin-
istrative law judge indicated that the Commission must consider the public
interest in pursuing section 337 investigations but that this does not mean
that "the question of the public interest as it relates to the Commission's
decision to institute the investigation should be continually reexamined."
92
The judge's position seemed to be that the public interest requirement can-
not be raised for consideration throughout section 337 proceedings because
the Commission's decision to initiate an investigation is not conclusive of a
violation. Rather, the decision to initiate an investigation indicates merely
that the complaint is sufficient on its face and complies with the ITC's rules.
Once the merits of the complaint have been determined in adversarial pro-
ceedings and the investigation concluded, allegations of bad faith and inequi-
table conduct, if proven, can be considered, and they "could have a bearing"
on the ultimate resolution of the investigation.9 3 The judge implied that the
public interest must be balanced against the merits of the complainant's alle-
gations. Thus, the judge put greater emphasis on the need for expeditious
relief under section 337, holding that it is of "paramount importance." 94 On
the other hand, Congress stressed that the public interest must be para-
mount95 in such investigations, a view also expressed in Commission
opinions.96
The practical considerations of limited facilities and personnel that con-
tributed to the imposition of the uncompromising duty of candor in dealing
with the PTO97 can be applied to the ITC, particularly in section 337 pro-
ceedings, with equal or greater justification. Moreover, such practical limi-
tations are complicated by the time constraints imposed on section 337
proceedings by statute. Once a complaint has been filed, the ITC has thirty
days, or, in exceptional cases, longer, to determine whether a complaint has
been properly pled and to vote on whether to institute an investigation.9"
91. Id.
92. Id. at 3-4. The Administrative Law Judge's (A.L.J.'s) denial of respondent's motion
may have been influenced by the fact that the Commission staff opposed the motion and denied
being misled. This should be immaterial. As noted above, the duty of candor is uncompromis-
ing, and the fact of misrepresentation has been held to be more important than what is misrep-
resented, even when the misrepresentation had no effect. See supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
93. Order No. 10 (1984), supra note 90, at 4.
94. Id.
95. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 193.
96. See, e.g., Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes & Components, Inv. No. 337-
TA-67, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 1119, at 21-31 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Acceleration Tubes].
97. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
98. 19 C.F.R. § 210.12 (1985).
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Usually an investigation must be concluded no later than twelve months af-
ter the publication of the notice of investigation in the Federal Register.99 In
the case of investigations designated "more complicated," the period may be
extended by up to six months." ° Although a decision to investigate is pre-
ceded by an investigation by the Commission staff, this informal investiga-
tion is intended only to determine the sufficiency of the complaint and the
availability of information.'' Thus, time constraints alone indicate that the
Commission and its investigative staff, like the PTO, must rely on informa-
tion disclosed by the complainant.
Limitations of time and personnel are further aggravated by the complex-
ity of section 337 investigations and the number of investigations being pur-
sued simultaneously.' °2 Moreover, these constraints favor the complainant
who obviously has had the advantage of choice of forum and of determining
the precise time to move the Commission to institute an investigation."0 3
More importantly, the complainant has had time to prepare the major ele-
ments of his case prior to institution of the investigation and has done so
without the time constraints imposed on ITC proceedings.' 0 In contrast,
the respondent frequently has no warning of a complaint until the Commis-
sion has already decided to institute an investigation. Unlike the complain-
ant, all the respondent's activity is subject to the ITC's time constraints.
Another advantage to a complainant in a section 337 proceeding is that a
respondent can only defend; he cannot raise counterclaims as he could in a
court proceeding. In exchange for such advantages, a duty of candor is a
small price to exact from a complainant."0 5
99. Id. § 210.59.
100. Id.
101. Id. § 210.11.
102. In fiscal 1984, for example, the Commission completed 35 investigations under § 337.
1984 ANN. REP., supra note 2, at viii. That same year, the Commission initiated 39 investiga-
tions and 40 were pending. Id. at 11. Although not all potential respondents in § 337 proceed-
ings choose to participate, ITC investigations frequently involve a large number of
respondents. One investigation involved 11 foreign manufacturers and exporters and 25 do-
mestic importers as respondents. Certain Molded Golf Balls, Inv. No. 337-TA-35, U.S.I.T.C.
Pub. 897, at 2 (1978). A recent investigation involved 32 respondents. Certain Products with
Gremlin Character Depictions, Inv. No. 337-TA-201, 49 Fed. Reg. 34,422-23 (1984).
103. Kaye, Lupo, & Lipman, The Jurisdictional Paradigm between the United States Inter-
national Trade Commission and the Federal District Courts, 64 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 116, 126
(1982).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 127. Admittedly, a plaintiff before a court can put the defendant at similar
disadvantage. A key difference is time. Judicial proceedings do not operate under the time
constraints statutorily imposed on § 337 proceedings. See 49 Fed. Reg. 46,124-25 (1984)
(Commission response rejecting complaint about burden placed on foreign respondents by 19
C.F.R. § 210.21 (1985) of the Commission rules requiring response within 30 days of date of
notice of the investigation).
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A stronger argument for a duty of candor and the imposition of sanctions
for its violation can be based on public policy and the role of the ITC. A
proceeding under section 337 is not a lawsuit between private parties. Prior
to the publication of a notice of investigation in the Federal Register, section
337 proceedings are ex parte, similar to the prosecution of a patent before
the PTO. Thus, a complainant who enters the ITC forum invokes a public
investigation by an agency of the United States Government. The agency is
not charged with adjudicating private disputes or with safeguarding a partic-
ular complaining firm; it is charged with safeguarding an entire industry in
the United States. 1
0 6
D. Order No. 19 and Fraud in the Context of Section 337 Proceedings
In two recent patent cases the Federal Circuit considered the issue of in-
tent in dealing with allegations of fraud on the PTO, and both are relevant in
the context of section 337 proceedings before the ITC. In J.P. Stevens & Co.
v. Lex Tex Ltd., the Federal Circuit held that inequitable conduct requires
proof of "threshold intent."'0 7 But the proof does not require direct evi-
dence; it can be established by showing that the actor presumably intended
the "natural consequences" of his acts."0 The Stevens court also stated that
gross negligence, judged by the same objective reasonable person standard
used later in Argus, is sufficient to establish the requisite intent.'0 9 In short,
the court in Stevens refused to give "controlling effect" to an applicant's
subjective judgment. " 0
Argus Chemical Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., "' the second case, was
also a patent infringement action that involved consideration of the appro-
priate standard for determining fraud or inequitable conduct in prosecution
of a patent application where, admittedly, material information was with-
held. The defendant had raised the defense of invalidity alleging that Argus
was guilty of fraud or inequitable conduct for failing to reveal prior sales in
its application.'' 2 The Federal Circuit unequivocally rejected the plaintiff's
explanations of "accepted standards"" 3 of practice before the PTO and the
allegation that "subjective good faith" negates fraud." 4 The court declared
106. Unfair Competition in the Importation of Resolvers, Inv. No. 316-1, 9 U.S. TARIFF
COMM'N ANN. REP. 106 (1925). 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982).
107. 747 F.2d at 1553, 1560.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1567.
111. 759 F.2dat 10.
112. Id. at 11-12.
113. Id. at 13.
114. Id. at 14.
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that the duty of candor to the PTO should not be judged "by the least com-
mon denominator.""' 5 The Federal Circuit thus rejected subjective intent as
a relevant factor in a charge involving fraud or inequitable conduct before
the PTO and reiterated that the relevant consideration in determining ineq-
uitable conduct or fraud is the materiality of the information withheld. In-
tent is judged by an objective or "reasonable" person standard.",
6
According to the opinion in Argus, the standard is whether a reasonable
person, in the position of the plaintiff, "knew or should have known that
information was material."''1 This was the same test the court applied in
Stevens. In both cases, the court was almost certainly influenced by the com-
plexity of the patent process and the potential for abuse of the patent system,
if the subjective evaluation of the applicant is allowed to determine what
information is material and what should be called to the attention of the
patent examiner. Likewise, making intent dependent on subjective consider-
ations also has thee potential for subjecting the patent process to abuse. It,
therefore, appears that the underlying concern of the Federal Circuit in both
Stevens and Argus was the protection of the integrity of the patent system.
The issue of fraud on the Commission was raised as a defense in a recent
ITC section 337 investigation, Certain Fluidized Bed Combustion Systems, 8
where it was addressed by the administrative law judge in Order No. 19.' '9
The summary judgment motion that resulted in Order No. 19 involved the
question of whether the complainant's attorneys engaged in fraud on the
Commission when they failed to disclose the existence of foreign patent ap-
plications corresponding to the complainant's United States patents and in-
correctly informed the Commission investigative staff that no foreign patent
applications had been rejected. The judge did find that the undisclosed in-
formation was material' 2° but indicated that to find fraud, there must be
intent or a "[p]attern of reckless disregard or carelessness that would
amount to gross negligence that would support a finding of intent to mislead
the Commission."'' The order explained that there would be "no rea-
son"' 22 to find intent prior to the actual institution of an investigation-the
ex parte stage of the investigation-because the complainant would know, in
this and similar situations, that the supplied misinformation would be dis-
covered after the institution of the investigation when the proceedings be-
115. Id. at 13.
116. Id. at 14.
117. Id. at 15.
118. Inv. No. 337-TA-213, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 1752 (1985).
119. Order No. 19, supra note 27, at 1.
120. Id. at 8.
121. Id. at 9.
122. Id.
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come inter partes. Order No. 19 thus establishes a subjective standard
because it involves only consideration of the particular complainant's intent
or motivation. In contrast, the decisions in Argus and Stevens establish an
objective standard requiring consideration of what a reasonable person in the
complainant's position would have known.
Despite the complementing functions and procedural similarities between
the PTO and the ITC, Order No. 19 held that an attorney appearing before
the ITC owes a duty of candor but held that the duty is not analogous to
that applicable before the PTO. The judge found the duty of candor owed to
the ITC and the PTO similar in that it would not be appropriate to require
proof of all the elements of common law fraud in proceedings in either fo-
rum.1 23 However, the duties are dissimilar, according to Order No. 19, be-
cause the intent to mislead the Commission should not be inferred from an
inadvertent mistake made through ordinary negligence or in good faith. 1
24
The judge's opinion did not address public policy concerns.
125
In Order No. 19, the judge noted the Federal Circuit's decisions in Argus
and Stevens addressing fraud on the PTO26 and concluded that they appear
to have lowered the standard of proof. The judge stated that the courts
"used to find" an intent to mislead only when there was evidence to prove
actual intent or gross negligence, and claimed that the Federal Circuit's
opinions in Stevens and Argus "blurred" the distinction between the test for
materiality and the test for intent.127 The judge correctly noted that, under
Argus and Stevens, gross negligence is sufficient to find intent and that gross
negligence can be shown when a reasonable person should have known that
the withheld information was material. She also noted that good faith is not
a defense under the "new" Federal Circuit standard. 128 However, the judge
found this standard too high and specifically held that this "new" Federal
Circuit standard should not apply in section 337 proceedings.'
29
123. Id. at 5.
124. Id. at 5-6.
125. Order No. 19 was the A.L.J.'s decision on motions for summary determination based
on fraud on the Commission and fraud on the PTO. Only that part of the Order relevant to
the defense of fraud on the Commission is considered here. The Commission's final opinion
did not address the issue of fraud on the ITC. Inv. No. 337-TA-213, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 1752.
The Commission terminated the investigation on other grounds. 50 Fed. Reg. 30,242 (1985).
126. Order No. 19, supra note 27, at 2-5.
127. Id. at 4.
128. Id. at 4-5.
129. Id. at 5. The judge interpreted the court's opinion in Argus as indicating that "neces-
sary intent could be found without considering the relative importance of the information that
was omitted." By applying this reasonable person standard, the judge interpreted the court's
opinion as eliminating a separate requirement of intent to deceive or proof of gross negligence.
The judge stated, "If an attorney in good faith fails to disclose a fact that a reasonable exam-
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Instead, the administrative law judge held, without explanation, that the
duty of candor owed to the ITC is comparable to the duty owed to a
court.' 30 In context, the judge appears to have meant that proceedings
before a court are adversarial from the start while PTO patent prosecution is
an ex parte proceeding, requiring a higher duty. In contrast, ITC proceed-
ings were described simply as not ex parte, suggesting the judge considered
them to be adversarial in the same sense that judicial proceedings are. How-
ever, this is incorrect. 1 ' Despite the judge's reference to the duty of candor
owed the ITC being similar to the duty owed to a court, the judge apparently
did not take into account recent revisions of rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure under which good faith is also not a defense. 32
Applying the Stevens "natural consequences" standard or "gross negli-
gence" to the issue in Order No. 19, it is clear that the result of failing to
disclose facts to the ITC is that the ITC, in evaluating the complaint, did not
have all the material facts during its deliberations and was the victim of
fraud. Moreover, the facts involved information clearly available to the
complainant, who owned all the patents at issue. The patentee or his agents
should reasonably know the status of his patents and the status of any for-
eign applications. Because the ITC rules specifically ask for the status of
foreign patent applications, 33 the complainant was also on notice that the
ITC considered the information relevant and material.
In Order No. 19, the judge distinguished the Argus and Stevens decisions
from Combustion Systems on the basis that the Federal Circuit cases were
patent cases while Combustion Systems was an unfair competition case. The
judge noted that prosecution of a patent is an ex parte proceeding in which a
patent may be granted without any adversarial proceeding while a section
337 proceeding is adversarial during which a mistake is likely to be discov-
ered. '34 In the judge's opinion, there would be no reason to find an intent to
mislead the Commission prior to the issuance of a notice of investigation
based solely on a showing that the withheld information would have been
material or important to the Commission.135
The distinctions drawn in Order No. 19 ignore several important factors
iner would have thought to be important, this is proof that the information was material and
that there was intent to mislead the Patent Office." Id. (emphasis in original). This is exactly
what the Argus court held: "Counsel's subjective 'good faith' does not, therefore, negate ineq-
uitable conduct." Argus, 759 F.2d at 14-15.
130. Order No. 19, supra note 27, at 5.
131. See infra notes 138-44 and accompanying text.
132. See Schwarzer, supra note 71; see also supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
133. 19 C.F.R. § 210.20(a)(9)(iv) (1985).
134. Order No. 19, supra note 27, at 9.
135. Id. at 8-10.
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that have particular relevance in a section 337 proceeding. The ITC insti-
tutes an investigation based on the allegations of the complainant. The
Commission rules require that an investigation be instituted within thirty
days of receipt of a properly filed complaint. Thus, a respondent can be
brought before the Commission on the basis of inaccurate, incomplete or
even fraudulent information. 136 At a minimum, such a practice burdens the
respondent with possibly unnecessary legal fees and may prejudice it in the
eyes of the public. Additionally, the judge's standard could make an agency
of the United States a party to an abuse of section 337 investigation
procedures.' 
37
Order No. 19 notes that section 337 investigations, unlike PTO proceed-
ings, are not ex parte. This is an accurate but incomplete characterization of
such proceedings. At the institution stage, there is no adversary. The Com-
mission decides whether to institute an investigation on the basis of the com-
plaint and an informal investigation by its staff of investigative attorneys.
This investigation is not designed to evaluate the validity of a complainant's
allegations; rather, it is intended only to identify relevant information and
determine its availability.' 31 It is only after institution that there is a true
adversarial procedure. 139 Moreover, the ITC's jurisdiction is in rem 4 ' and
the named respondents may not enter an appearance before the Commission
or otherwise contest the complainant's allegations. In this situation, a de-
fault judgment may be entered against the respondent,' 4 ' and the complain-
ant may obtain relief without an adversarial proceeding.' 4 2 Consequently,
the judge's reliance on discovery 4 3 in a contested section 337 proceeding to
ferret out false, misleading or incomplete information 144 may well be
misplaced.
136. See, e.g., Order No. 10 (1984), supra note 90, at 2-3.
137. Other agencies of the government, such as the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission, can also be needlessly involved and burdened by an investigation based on
a fraudulent complaint because the statute requires the Commission to consult with relevant
government agencies in the case of a § 337 investigation. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(2) (1982).
138. 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.11-.12 (1985).
139. Id. § 210.21.
140. Certain Steel Rod Treating Apparatus & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-97,
U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 1210, app. B (1982).
141. 19 C.F.R. § 210.25 (1985).
142. Id. § 210.25(c).
143. Id. §§ 210.30-.36.
144. Order No. 19, supra note 27, at 9. The ITC does have a staff of investigative attorneys
who are parties to each § 337 investigation. 19 C.F.R. § 210.4(c) (1985). Given the workload
of the Commission's investigative staff, however, it may well be unrealistic to expect the inves-
tigative attorney to pursue an investigation with the same vigor as a respondent, particularly
when the named respondent has chosen to ignore the Commission proceedings. When a re-
spondent chooses not to participate, the most necessary information to refute a complainant's
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The possibility of a default judgment 45 is at odds with the statement in
Order No. 19 that section 337 investigations are not ex parte because in the
case of default, there is no real adversary. The Commission investigative
attorney is a party, however, and could oppose the complainant, but, with
the respondent not appearing, access to relevant information is necessarily
limited. Thus, if the respondents default, the complainant will go through
both the initiation stage and the investigation ex parte.
As noted above, public interest is paramount in section 337 proceedings.
The statute provides that in the case of a violation of section 337, the infring-
ing product may be excluded unless the Commission determines that nonex-
clusion is in the best interest of the public health and welfare and
competitive conditions in the domestic economy. 146 The legislative history
makes clear, however, that these factors "must be the overriding considera-
tions" in section 337 proceedings.' 4 7 The standard set by Order No. 19 ig-
nores these factors and, it ignores Supreme Court dicta that because a
patent, by its very nature involves the public interest, equity, under the clean
hands doctrine, will deny a patent holder who gains a patent through inequi-
table means the fruit of his inequity and protect the public interest. 4 ' The
consequences of a section 337 exclusion order are tantamount to the grant of
a patent; the PTO creates the monopoly by granting the patent, while the
ITC protects the patentee's market from unfair foreign competition.' 4 9
allegation is likely to be unavailable to the Commission investigative attorney because, in such
a situation, discovery is impossible.
145. In case of default judgment, complainant must, nonetheless, make a reasonable effort
to establish a prima facie case. Refusal of respondents to participate may make it difficult for a
complainant to establish clearly that the respondents have violated § 337 because discovery is
foreclosed. In such a case, the Commission has indicated that the complainant should be able
to offer as proof: (1) samples of the allegedly infringing products, (2) evidence of actual impor-
tation such as customs invoices, (3) verification of sales lost to the infringing product. See
Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps, supra note 8, at 3-4.
146. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d), (e). However, it is rare for the Commission to find that public
interest factors outweigh the injury standards of § 337. For examples of where this has oc-
curred, see Acceleration Tubes, supra note 96 (pure scientific research) and Certain Crankpin
Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 1022 (1979) (energy conservation).
147. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 197.
148. Digital Equipment Corp., 210 U.S.P.Q. at 532-33.
149. In a Commission opinion, the Chairwoman and three Commissioners noted that a
patent holder is entitled, through intellectual property laws, to "exclude competitors entirely
from using the intellectual property" covered by patent trademark or copyright. Certain stat-
utes are designed to protect intellectual property rights per se while § 337 is a complementary
trade statute intended to protect "the actual operations of the relevant domestic industry,"
that is, its markets. The one operates to protect a property right irrespective of the existence of
a domestic industry, while the other, § 337, only operates when a domestic industry suffers or
is likely to suffer injury due to importation of goods into the United States. Since § 337 offers
remedies " 'in addition to any other provisions of law,' " a patent-based domestic industry can,
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II. THE ITC: WHAT STANDARD SHOULD APPLY?
The policy considerations that played a role in the revision of rule 11,150
including the cost and complexity of litigation, the imposition of unjustified
burdens on other parties, and the bringing of the judicial system into disre-
pute, are equally relevant in proceedings before the ITC, the PTO, and the
FCC. An administrative agency like the PTO or the ITC, perhaps even
more than a court, relies on the expectation that a party appearing before it
will observe a duty of candor and full disclosure.' 5'
In the case of a section 337 investigation, reliance on the information sup-
plied by a potential complainant is as significant as the reliance placed by the
court in the pleadings of the parties appearing before it. The ITC, therefore,
should be equally concerned with preserving the integrity of the forum. In
another context, the Commission has expressed its concern for preserving
the integrity of the ITC forum and its proceedings. In its opinion in Certain
Optical Waveguide Fibers,52 the Commission majority noted that section
337 proceedings are unique among ITC proceedings because they are gov-
erned by the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act. The majority
stressed that, for this reason, the Commission could base its review of an
administrative law judge's determination only on the record certified to it by
the judge. Therefore, it had to disregard submissions that were not part of
this record because "it is essential that the integrity of the administrative
process not be compromised."' 53 The imposition of severe sanctions when
the ITC itself is the victim of fraud or other inequitable conduct by a com-
plainant or a respondent would further the Commission's interest in preserv-
ing the integrity of its proceedings. Sanctions would also serve as a
deterrent. A persuasive argument can be made that the ITC should, when it
is the victim of fraud, impose severe sanctions analogous to those imposed by
the PTO.
The ITC's function in a section 337 proceeding is analogous to the func-
tion of the PTO in granting a patent. The grant of a patent prohibits other
domestic producers from infringing the patentee's rights by excluding them
from the market covered by the patent. Similarly, an ITC exclusion order,
as the name implies, excludes a foreign competitor from the same market
if it meets the proper criteria, avail itself of the protections offered by both intellectual property
laws and the trade laws. Certain Optical Waveguide Fibers, supra note 14, at 12.
150. Schwarzer, supra note 71, at 181-82.
151. Id. a 193. See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)
(1981).
152. Certain Optical Waveguide Fibers, supra note 14, at 4; 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1982 &
Supp. 1 1983).
153. Certain Optical Waveguide Fibers, supra note 14, at 4.
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when the foreign competitor infringes the complainant's patent and injures
or would tend to injure a domestic industry. In sum, both the ITC and the
PTO have similar underlying purposes: to encourage development by guar-
anteeing a patent holder's opportunity to recover research and development
costs and to earn the profits that encourage risktaking. Their functions, ad-
ditionally, involve the protection and promotion of the public interest.
Procedurally, the agencies are similar in that they both conduct ex parte
proceedings: the PTO during the prosecution of a patent application and the
ITC during the institution stage of a section 337 investigation. In the case of
the ITC, a section 337 investigation itself is adversarial. There is an impor-
tant procedural difference between the two agencies, however. Despite the
fact that both are dependent on full disclosure by the individual or organiza-
tion seeking the benefit of their functions, only the PTO imposes a strict duty
of candor or full disclosure. The duty is stated explicitly in the PTO rules
which note that a patent will not be granted when fraud is apparent.' 54 This
severe sanction has been recognized by the Supreme Court and, more re-
cently, restated in modified form by the Federal Circuit.
In approving the invalidation of a patent for fraud, the courts have cited
various factors such as the PTO's limited resources and its reliance on infor-
mation provided by the patentee. Without denigrating the importance of
these factors, they are mere glosses on the underlying and frequently un-
stated rationale for judicial approval of the sanction. Essentially, the courts
are trying to protect the integrity of the patent system, to protect the public
from abuses of the system, and to deny the wrongdoer the benefit of his
inequitable conduct. As the Supreme Court noted in Precision Instrument
Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 155
A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. ...
• . . Those who have applications pending with the Patent Office
or who are parties to Patent Office proceedings have an uncompro-
mising duty to report to it all facts concerning possible fraud or
inequitableness underlying the applications in issue. . . . This
duty is not excused by reasonable doubts as to the sufficiency of the
proof of the inequitable conduct nor by resort to independent legal
advice. Public interest demands that all facts relevant to such mat-
ters be submitted formally or informally to the Patent Office,
which can then pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence. Only in
154. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
155. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
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this way can that agency act to safeguard the public in the first
instance against fraudulent patent monopolies ...
• . . The public policy against the assertion and enforcement of
patent claims infected with fraud and perjury is too great to be
overridden by such a [subjective] consideration.1
5 6
Both the explicit and implicit rationales for approving the PTO sanction
apply with equal force in the case of section 337 proceedings and would
justify imposition of severe sanctions when the ITC is the victim of fraud or
inequitable conduct. Sanctions are particularly appropriate in the fact pat-
tern covered by Order No. 19 in Combustion Systems. The withheld infor-
mation was clearly within the control of the complainant and his attorneys
or agents; certainly it was more readily available to them than to respondent
or the Commission investigative staff. Moreover, the Commission rules are
specific about the level of detail required in a complaint and complainant
had notice. At a minimum, failure to supply the required information would
appear to be gross negligence, which satisfies the threshold intent require-
ment of Stevens and should warrant a severe sanction. Sanctions are pre-
scribed in the PTO rules. The ITC itself applies sanctions when its discovery
procedures are violated and these sanctions have been upheld in the courts
also applying sanctions for violations of procedural rules.
1 57
Despite the apparent persuasiveness of arguments for sanctions analogous
to those imposed by the PTO, strong counterarguments can be marshaled to
suggest that such severe sanctions would defeat the very purpose of section
337 investigations. Dismissal of a complaint for fraud on the Commission
would obviously penalize the individual complainant but, at the same time,
could adversely affect the public interest and damage a domestic industry,
both of which the Commission, by statute, must protect. Thus, strict appli-
cations of the PTO standard could work a serious injustice on a complainant
and, at the same time, allow a wrongdoer, who had violated United States
law, to go unpunished, because a complaint could be dismissed without con-
sideration of its merits. In the abstract, the consequences of such a result are
difficult to calculate, but it seems that the negative effect on the public inter-
est, health, welfare, and competitive conditions in the United States could be
extensive.
156. Id. at 815-19 (citations omitted).
157. See, e.g., Certain Ultrafiltration Membrane Systems and Components Thereof, includ-
ing Ultrafiltration Membranes, Inv. No. 337-TA-107, Order No. 10 (1981) (sanctions imposed
on complainant, who was unable to prove that noncompliance with discovery orders was not
willful); Certain Welded Stainless Steel, supra note 5 (Commission approved sanctions im-
posed by presiding officer on respondent for destructive conduct during discovery; Commis-
sion also imposed sanctions by making adverse inference unfavorable to respondent).
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Dismissal, as the only sanction, could also encourage respondent abuse of
the Commission's expedited procedures. Knowing that a meritorious com-
plaint could be dismissed on a showing of fraud on the Commission, a re-
spondent, faced with a strong complaint, would have the incentive to peruse
a complaint in search of even a minor inaccuracy or omission that could be
construed as fraudulent in the hope of diverting attention from its own ac-
tion. Given the amount of information required from a complainant seeking
a section 337 investigation, the possibility of finding an error, even a minor
one, that could be construed as complainant fraud is not to be dismissed
lightly. If such efforts by respondent ultimately proved unsuccessful they,
nonetheless, could require protracted hearings relating to complainant's con-
duct rather than the complaint. In effect, the complainant, rather than the
complaint, would be on trial. This would make it more difficult to complete
section 337 investigations within the statutorily prescribed limits and in-
crease the costs of the investigation, a not insignificant consideration for a
small complainant taking on a wealthy respondent or several small respon-
dents. The prospect of increased costs resulting from such dilatory tactics
by a respondent intent on preserving its access to the United States market
could discourage a complainant from seeking a section 337 remedy, particu-
larly since the Commission remedies in such investigations do not include
money damages. Additionally, this type of abuse could threaten, if not
thwart, the legislative intent that section 337 remedies be provided
expeditiously.
III. CONCLUSION
The purpose of a section 337 investigation is to protect the public interest
and a domestic industry from the consequences of unfair competitive acts in
the importation of goods into the United States. Because many of these in-
vestigations involve allegations of patent infringement, the ITC function in
this area complements the function of the PTO; the former protecting a lim-
ited monopoly created by the latter's action in granting a patent. Procedur-
ally, the two agencies are similar in that they employ ex parte proceedings,
albeit not to the same extent. Both agencies are also similar in that during ex
parte proceedings, they are dependent on the complainant or applicant to
deal fairly and candidly. The dependence of the agencies creates the poten-
tial for abuse in the form of fraud. The PTO, unlike the ITC, has formally
recognized this possibility and has developed a way to protect the integrity
of the patent system by acknowledging the defense of fraud on the PTO.
The PTO standard in dealing with fraud or inequitable conduct is based
on equitable principles that require an uncompromising duty of candor and
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full-disclosure in dealing with the PTO. The duty of candor forbids affirma-
tive misrepresentation and omission because the relationship between a pat-
ent applicant and the PTO is confidential and ex parte. Its purpose is to
protect the public interest and the integrity of the patent system and to deny
a violator the fruits of his wrongdoing. On a more practical level, the duty
of candor recognizes the limited facilities and personnel available to the PTO
to investigate a patent applicant's claims.
Such considerations apply with equal force to the ex parte stage of a sec-
tion 337 investigation. Because of the legislative directive that the ITC con-
sider patent law and doctrine as well as all legal and equitable defenses, it
may appear appropriate that the ITC utilize the equivalent of a denial of a
patent-dismissal of a section 337 complaint when complainant has commit-
ted fraud or other inequitable acts during the institution stage of an
investigation.
Dismissal would certainly have a deterrent effect and would vindicate the
integrity of the forum, making the sanction superficially very attractive.
Nonetheless, there are two serious disadvantages to this approach. On the
one hand, it could well encourage a respondent to nit-pick a complaint for
inadequacies, in the hope of having a complaint dismissed before the merits
are reached. This could cause needless delays in proceedings that should be
expeditious in order to achieve maximum effectiveness. Additionally, the
prospect of such a severe sanction could discourage the filing of a valid com-
plaint. On the other hand, the effect of this sanction would extend beyond
the individual complaint and adversely affect the public interest that is sup-
posed to be paramount in section 337 investigations. For these reasons, a
more appropriate sanction may be the imposition of sanctions similar to
those authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The sanction would
vindicate the integrity of the forum and, because section 337 investigations
can be expensive, might well have a deterrent effect. Additionally, the bene-
ficial effects of such a sanction are achieved without adversely affecting the
public interest, while allowing a determination of the merits of the
complaint.
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